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Abstract. This paper provides an analysis of individual and social decision criteria for
alternatives that are composed of several attributes. We derive additive and multiplica-
tive criteria for individual decision-making with new axioms and apply these criteria to
obtain new justications of known social choice rules with a bargaining interpretation,
namely, the generalized utilitarian and Nash social choice functions. Unlike most ax-
iomatizations of bargaining solutions, our approach is, to a large extent, based on the
multi-attribute structure of the underlying alternatives and the resulting individual de-
cision criteria instead of axioms that impose restrictions on the choice function directly.
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A standard cooperative bargaining solution as introduced by Nash (1950) assigns a utility
vector to each pair of a utility possibilities set and a disagreement point (the utility
vector resulting if the agents fail to reach an agreement) within a given domain. For
example, a typical domain of a bargaining solution consists of all pairs such that the
disagreement point is normalized to be the origin and the utility possibilities set is convex
and compact. Comprehensiveness of the feasible set frequently is required as well. In this
paper, we consider an informationally richer framework by allowing for the possibility
that the structure of the set of objects over which the bargaining process takes place may
matter. In particular, we examine multi-attribute bargaining problems. A typical example
for a multi-attribute bargaining problem is a wage-employment bargaining model such as
the one developed by McDonald and Solow (1981).
To begin with, we provide new axiomatic derivations of additive and multiplicative
multi-attribute criteria for an individual decision maker. The preferences of a decision
maker over lotteries of attribute combinations are additive if they can be represented by
a von-Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utility function1 that can be written as the sum of
the utilities of the individual attributes. The multiplicative decision criterion is based
on the product of the utilities over attributes. Clearly, these types of preferences possess
separability properties with respect to the attributes under consideration.
Specically, we use a weak version of utility independence2 together with an additivity
axiom to generate an additive representation of an agent's preferences. Similarly, we show
that the multiplicative decision criterion is implied by an analogous utility independence
axiom and a condition regarding the existence and properties of worst possible attributes.
By employing these new axioms, the paper also makes a contribution to the theory of
decision-making under uncertainty in the presence of several attributes.
Turning from individual to social decision-making, we rst characterize eciency in
both the additive and the multiplicativecase. This eciencycriterion, together with some
other assumptions, is then used to derive social decision procedures with a bargaining
interpretation. In the additive case, eciency and an independence condition regarding
the restriction of choices to specic attributes lead to the generalized (not necessarily
symmetric) utilitarian social choice functions, provided a mild regularity condition is
satised. Analogously, in the multiplicative case, generalized Nash social choice functions
1See Fishburn (1970) for a comprehensive treatment of utility theory.
2See, for instance, Keeney and Raia (1976) and the references quoted there.
1are obtained. The novel aspect of those axiomatic derivations of well-known social choice
functions is that much of the structure is imposed through the individual preferences
rather than through axioms that operate directly on the social choice function itself. We
therefore provide a decision-theoretic foundation of these commonly-used solutions.
2 Multi-attribute preferences
Let I N denote the set of positive integers, and let I R (I R+, I R++) be the set of all (nonneg-
ative, positive) real numbers. For n 2 I N, I Rn is the n-fold Cartesian product of I R.L e t
M= f 1 ;:::;mgbe a set of m 2 I N attributes. The sets A1;:::;A mare the corresponding
non-empty spaces of these attributes. Let A = j2MAj.F o r a 2 A and M0  M,l e t
a − M 0 be the subvector of a that contains the components in M n M0 only. If M0 is a
singleton fjg, we use the simpler notation a−j instead of a−fjg. Analogously, for A0  A
and M0  M, A0
−M0 = j2MnM0A0




L(A) is the set of all lotteries (i.e., nite probability distributions) over A.W ei d e n t i f y
a sure alternative a 2 A with a lottery that assigns probability one to a. Suppose there
is a decision maker who has a preference relation (i.e., a complete and transitive binary
relation) on L(A), representable by a vNMutilityfunction u:L(A) ! I R.3 We also assume
that there is a xed m-tuple a0 2 A with u(a)  u(a0) for all a 2 A.T h a t i s , a 0is a
worst alternative in A.4
Let j 2 M.B y x i n gt h em − 1 attributes in M nf jgat given levels a0
−j 2 A−j,t h e
utility function u induces a utility function uj:L(Aj) ! I R on the set of lotteries over
the attribute space Aj. It is straightforward to see that this induced utility function is
again of the vNM type. For a lottery ` 2L ( A ), the corresponding induced lottery on Aj
is denoted by `j 2L ( A j).
The property of utilityindependence (see Keeney and Raia, 1976, in particular Chap-
ters 5 and 6) requires that the induced utility function is independent of the specic levels
of the other attributes. To dene this property formally, let ;6 =A 0A ,a n dl e tj2M .
A 0
jis utility independent of A0
−j if there exist functions fj:A0
−j ! I R and gj:A0
−j ! I R++
3One may assume that the von-Neumann-Morgenstern (1947) or Herstein-Milnor (1953) axioms hold,
so that such a u exists.
4For convenience, we formulate the relevant denitions in terms of the vNM utility function u.I ti s
straightforward to obtain equivalent formulations in terms of the underlying preference relation.
2such that, for any arbitrary a0
−j 2 A0
−j,
u(a)=f j( a − j)+g j( a − j) u ( a j;a 0
−j) for all a 2 A0.( 1 )
Clearly, utility independence is a separability property. (1) means that, on the restricted
domain A0, lotteries over the values of attribute j can be assessed without knowledge of
specic values of the remaining attributes. See Keeney and Raia (1976) for a detailed
discussion of this and related separability assumptions in this framework.
3 Additive decision criteria
In this section, we show that a specic utility independence requirement and a weak
additivity assumption imply that u must be additive.
Restricted a0 utility independence requires that we can nd a chain of m−1 attributes
such that, for eachattribute j in this chain, Aj is utilityindependentof all other attributes,
where this independence can be restricted to attribute values of a0
k for all attributes k that
appear before j in the chain. For simplicity of exposition, we formulate this condition for
the chain consisting of the rst m − 1 attributes and leave the obvious generalization to
the reader.
Restricted a0 utility independence:
A1 is utility independent of A−1;
A2 is utility independent of fa0
1gA −f1;2g;
. . .
Am−1 is utility independent of fa0
1gf a 0
2g:::f a 0
m − 2gA m:
This independence axiom is considerably weaker than Keeney and Raia's (1976) mutual
utility independence because, for each j 2 M nf 1 ;mg, all attributes k<jin the chain
c a nb e x e da ta 0
k . Moreover, only m − 1 rather than all m attributes are required to
satisfy an independence condition.
The second axiom is a weakening of additive independence (see Keeney and Raia,
1976). Again, we state this condition for a chain involving the rst m−1 attributes only
in order to simplify notation.
Restricted additive independence:
For all a−1 2 A−1,t h e r ee x i s ta 0
1 ;a 00
1 2 A1 such that u(a0
1;a −1)+u ( a 00
1;a 0
−1)=
u ( a 0
1;a 0
−1)+u ( a 00






for all a−f1;2g 2 A−f1;2g,t h e r ee x i s ta 0
2 ;a 00
2 2 A2 such that u(a0
1;a 0
2;a −f1;2g)+
u ( a 00
2;a 0
−2)=u ( a 0
2;a 0
−2)+u ( a 0
1;a 00








for all am 2 Am,t h e r ee x i s ta 0
m − 1;a 00






−(m−1))=u ( a 0




m−1;a m)a n du ( a 0





Analogously to restricted a0 utility independence, the requirements imposed by restricted
additive independence become successively weaker as we progress along the chain of at-
tributes. Restricted additive independence is analogous in spirit to Keeney and Raia's
(1976) additive independence (formulated for two attributes only). Additive indepen-
dence requires that there exist some attribute values a0
1;a 00
1 2 A1 and a0
2;a 00


















2). Our version of the additive independence condition, in contrast, requires the
existence of specic attribute values for several values of the other attributes, and the
worst attribute combination a0 must be involved. This is the case because we combine
the axiom with a rather weak form of utility independence|namely, restricted a0 utility
independence|, whereas Keeney and Raia (1976) employ the much stronger mutual
utility independence. Furthermore, note that restricted additive independence only re-
quires two of the utility values involvedto be distinct, but additive independence demands
two inequalities of that kind.
The following theorem derives the additive decision criterion from the above axioms.
Note that, in order to reformulate the axioms for general chains in this theorem, the
same chains have to be used in both axioms. Recall that a0 is a worst alternative, i.e.,
u(a)  u(a0) for all a 2 A.
Theorem 1 Let u satisfy restricted a0 utility independence and restricted additive inde-




u ( a j;a
0
−j) for all a 2 A:
4Proof. Without loss of generality, assume u is normalized so that u(a0) = 0. Because A1
is utility independent of A−1, there exist functions f1 and g1 such that
u(a)=f 1( a − 1)+g 1( a − 1) u ( a 1;a 0
−1) for all a 2 A (2)
w h e r ew ec h o s ea 0
− 1=a 0
− 1in (1). Letting a1 = a0
1 in (2), we obtain f1(a−1)=u ( a 0
1;a −1)
for all a 2 A because u(a0) = 0. Therefore,
u(a)=u ( a 0
1;a −1)+g 1( a − 1) u ( a 1;a 0
−1) for all a 2 A: (3)
Because, by restricted additive independence, there exists a1 2 A1 such that u(a1;a 0
−1)6=
0, we can choose a−1 = a0
−1 in (3) and use u(a0)=0t oo b t a i ng 1( a 0
− 1)=1 .
Using restricted additive independence and (3), it follows that, for all a−1 2 A−1,t h e r e
exist a0
1;a 00

























g 1( a 0
− 1) = 1 for all a 2 A. Therefore,
u(a)=u ( a 0
1;a −1)+u ( a 1;a 0
−1) for all a 2 A: (4)
Because A2 is utility independent of fa0
1gA −f1;2g, there exist functions f2 and g2




1;a −1)=f 2( a 0
1;a −f1;2g)+g 2( a 0
1;a −f1;2g)u(a2;a 0
−2) for all a 2 A: (5)
Letting a2 = a0
2 in (5) and using u(a0) = 0, we obtain f2(a0
1;a −f1;2g)=u ( a 0
1;a 0
2;a −f1;2g)
for all a 2 A. Therefore,
u(a
0








−2) for all a 2 A: (6)
By restricted additive independence, there exists a2 2 A2 such that u(a2;a 0
−2) 6=0 .
Therefore, letting a−f1;2g = a0
−f1;2g in (6) implies g2(a0
−2)=1 .
By restricted additive independence and (6), for all a−f1;2g 2 A−f1;2g,t h e r ee x i s t
a 0
2 ;a 00


























−2) and, hence, g2(a0
1;a −f1;2g)=
g 2( a 0
− 2) = 1 for all a 2 A. Therefore,
u(a
0




2;a −f1;2g)+u ( a 2;a
0
−2) for all a 2 A: (7)
5Using (7) in (4), we obtain
u(a)=u ( a 0
1;a 0
2;a −f1;2g)+u ( a 2;a 0
−2)+u ( a 1;a 0
−1) for all a 2 A:
Repeated application of this argument for the attributes 3;:::;m−1 yields




−2)+u ( a 1;a
0
−1) for all a 2 A:




u j( ` j) for all ` 2L ( A ) ; (8)
where uj:L(Aj) ! I R for all j 2 M.
4 Multiplicative decision criteria
Keeney and Raia (1976) prove that if each attribute space Aj is utility independent of
A−j, then the vNM utility function u can be written as a multilinear function.5 In this
section, we derive the special case of a multiplicative decision criterion with a weaker
utility independence axiom and an assumption which requires the a0
j to lead to a worst
alternative even when combined with some values of a−j other than a0
−j.
To exclude degenerate cases, we assume that u is not a constant function. Let a 2 A
be such that u(a) >u ( a 0). The utility independence condition is parallel to the one in
the previous section, where a0 is replaced with a.
Restricted a utility independence:
A1 is utility independent of A−1;
A2 is utility independent of fa
1gA −f1;2g;
. . .
Am−1 is utility independent of fa
1gf a 
2g:::f a 
m − 2gA m:
The following axiom requires a0
j to lead to a worst alternative when combined with
certain values of a−j.
5See Keeney and Raia (1976, Chapters 5 and 6) for details.
6Restricted zero independence:
u(a0)  u(a0
1;a −1) for all a;a0 2 A; (9)
u(a0)  u(a
1;a 0





m−1;a m) for all a;a0 2 A: (11)
Restricted zero independence implies that a0
1 is a worst-possible value for attribute one
in an absolute sense: a0
1 leads to a worst alternative not only combined with a0
−1 but
combined with any value of a−1. The remaining restrictions imposed by the axiom are
weaker because they apply only to some but not to all values of the remaining attributes.
The above two axioms lead to the multiplicative decision criterion described in the
following theorem.
Theorem 2 Let u satisfy restricted a utility independence and restricted zero indepen-




u ( a j;a

−j) for all a 2 A:
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume u isnormalizedso that u(a0)=0a n du ( a )=1 .
(9) to (11) imply that we must have
u(a0
1;a −1) = 0 for all a 2 A; (12)
u(a
1;a 0





m−1;a m) = 0 for all a 2 A: (14)
Because A1 is utility independent of A−1,c h o o s i n ga 0
− 1=a 
− 1in (1) implies that there
exist functions f1 and g1 such that
u(a)=f 1( a − 1)+g 1( a − 1) u ( a 1;a

−1) for all a 2 A: (15)
Letting a1 = a0
1 in (15), (12) implies f1(a−1) = 0 for all a 2 A.
Now let a1 = a
1 in (15). Noting that f1(a−1)=0a n du ( a  ) = 1, it follows that
g1(a−1)=u ( a 





−1) for all a 2 A: (16)
7Because A2 is utility independent of fa




1;a −1)=f 2( a





−2) for all a 2 A (17)
(choose a0
−2 = a
−2 in (1)). Letting a2 = a0
2 in (17) and using (13), we obtain f2(a
1;a −f1;2g)=
0 for all a 2 A.N o wl e ta 2=a 
2in (17) to obtain g2(a
1;a −f1;2g)=u ( a 
1;a 
2;a −f1;2g) for all
a 2 A. Hence,
u(a
1;a −1)=u ( a 
1;a 
2;a −f1;2g)u(a2;a 
−2) for all a 2 A: (18)
Using (18) in (16), we obtain




−1) for all a 2 A:
Repeated application of this argument for the attributes 3;:::;m−1 yields
u(a)=u ( a m;a 
−m):::u(a 2;a 
−2)u(a 1;a 
−1) for all a 2 A:





u j( ` j) for all ` 2L ( A ) : (19)
5 Eciency
Consider now a situation where we have n 2 I N decision makers concerned with the multi-
attribute alternatives in A.L e tN= f 1 ;:::;ng denote the set of decision makers. We
use ui:L(A) ! I R to denote the vNM utility function of individual i 2 N. The induced
utility functions on L(Aj) are denoted by ui
j:L(Aj) ! I R for all j 2 M and all i 2 N.
For each agent i 2 N, a0i and ai are the alternatives corresponding to a0 and a in the
single-agent case. Note that these alternatives may be agent-specic.
In this framework, it is of interest to identify those lotteries that are ecient in the
sense that it is impossible to make everyone in N better o. Formally, a lottery ^ ` 2L ( A )
is ecient if and only if, for all ` 2L ( A ), there exists i 2 N such that ui(^ `)  ui(`).
The set of ecient lotteries can be characterized in the additive and multiplicative
cases discussed in the previous sections. If all agents' preferences have an additive repre-
sentation, we obtain the following result. Let n denote the unit simplex in I R.
8Theorem 3 Let each ui satisfy restricted a0i utility independence and restricted ad-
ditive independence. Then a lottery ^ ` 2L ( A )is ecient if and only if there exists
t =( t 1;:::;t n)2 n such that ^ ` maximizes
P





Proof. Because the set of utility vectors generated by the lotteries in L(A)i sc o n v e x ,




Suppose ^ ` 2L ( A ) maximizes
P
i2N tiui(`)o nL ( A )f o rs o m et2 n.B y( 8 ) ,



























j(`j) for all j 2 M.
Conversely, suppose ^ `j maximizes
P
i2N tiui
j(`j) for all j 2 M. Using (20), it follows
that ^ ` maximizes
P
i2N tiui(`)o nL ( A ).
In the multiplicative case, we obtain an analogous result. Analogously to Theorem 2,
we assume that, for each i 2 N, there exists ai 2 A such that ui(ai) >u i( a 0 i).
Theorem 4 Let each ui satisfy restricted ai utility independence and restricted zero
independence. Then a lottery ^ ` 2L ( A )is ecient if and only if there exists t =
(t1;:::;t n) 2  n such that ^ ` maximizes
Q
i2N ui(`)ti






Proof. Again, the convexity of the set of utility vectors generated by the lotteries in
L(A) implies that a lottery ^ ` 2L ( A ) is ecient if and only if there exists t 2 n such
that ^ ` maximizes
Q
i2N ui(`)ti on L(A) ,w h e r ew eu s et h ec o n v e n t i o n0 0:= 1.
Suppose ^ ` maximizes
Q







j( ` j) for all i 2 N; for all ` 2L ( A )









on L(A). Suppose rst that there exists k 2 N such that uk(^ `)tk =0 ,i nw h i c hc a s e
Q
i 2 Nu i ( ` ) t i
= 0. Note that this can occur only if tk > 0a n du k( ^ ` ) = 0. By assumption,
9there exists ai such that ui(ai) > 0 for all i 2 N.L e t` 2L ( A ) be such that ` assigns a
positive probability to each ai and zero to all other alternatives. This implies ui(`) > 0
for all i 2 N and thus
Q
i2N ui(`)ti
> 0, contradicting the observation that ^ ` maximizes
Q
i2N ui(`)ti
. Therefore, this case cannot occur, and we must have ui(^ `)ti



























for all j 2 M.
Now suppose ^ `j maximizes
Q
i2N ui
j(^ `j)ti on L(Aj) for all j 2 M. Because ui(ai) > 0
for all i 2 N, ui
j(ai
j ) > 0 for all i 2 N and for all j 2 M. Letting `
j 2L ( A j) be a lottery
that assigns a positive probability to each ai
j and zero to all other alternatives, it follows
that ui
j(`




j)ti > 0 for all j 2 M.




, it must be the case that ui
j(^ `j)ti
> 0




6 Multi-attribute bargaining problems
The results of the previous sections can be illustrated by applying the additive and multi-
plicative criteria to specic group decision problems. For example, consider the problem
of selecting outcomes from a feasible set of alternatives on the basis of the agents' prefer-
ences. Suppose the space of alternatives A is given, and we want to make a selection from
A for all proles of individual utility functions within a given class.6 Ap r o  l eo fv N M
utility functions is denoted by U =( u 1;:::;u n). The utility possibilities set generated by
the prole U is given by
fx 2 I R
n j9 `2L ( A ) such that x
i = u
i(`) for all i 2 Ng:
Accordingly, the induced utility possibilities set for attribute j 2 M is
fx 2 I R
n j9 ` j2L ( A j) such that x
i = u
i(`j) for all i 2 Ng:
Let U be a set of admissible proles U =( u 1 ;:::;u n) of vNM utility functions. Let
2L(A) be the set of all nonempty subsets of L(A). A social choice function is a mapping
6Because A is xed throughout this section, we simplify notation by suppressing the dependence of
the functions considered here on A.
10c:U!2 L ( A )such that, for all U 2Uand for all `;`0 2 c(U), ui(`)=u i( ` 0) for all i 2 N.
That is, we make the assumption commonly used in cooperative models of bargaining
that there is a unique utility vector associated with the selected outcomes. Interpreted
as a bargaining problem, the disagreement point is given by (u1(a01);:::;u n(a 0n)) =
(0;:::;0).7 A bargaining solution is a special case of a social choice function, where the
only relevant features are the utility possibilities set and the disagreement point of a
problem. Since this additional restriction is not necessary for the purposes of this section,
we will use the more general choice function c as dened above.
The social choice function c induces a choice function cj:U!2 L ( A j)for each attribute
j 2 M. Specically, for all j 2 M and all U 2U,c j( U)=f ` j2L ( A j)j`2c ( U) g .N o t e
that we do not have to require that the same utility vector results for all chosen lotteries
in the image of the induced choice functions|this property follows as a consequence of
our choice independence axiom dened below.
Using the results of the previous sections, we can derive generalized utilitarian and
generalized Nash social choice functions in this framework. In addition to the axioms on
individual preferences leading to the additive and multiplicative representations derived
above, we impose some restrictions on the choice function c.
First, we require c to be ecient in the sense that it selects ecient lotteries only. Let
E(U) denote the set of ecient lotteries in L(A) for the prole U 2U.
Eciency: For all U 2U,c ( U)E ( U).
Furthermore, we impose an independence condition regarding the choice of the indi-
vidual attributes.
Choice independence: For all j 2 M, for all U; ^ U 2U ,i fu i
j=^ u i
jfor all i 2 N,t h e n
u i
j( ` j)=u i
j( ^ ` j) for all `j 2 cj(U)a n df o ra l l^ ` j2c j(^ U ).
Choice independence requires that the selection of each attribute is independent of the
values of the remaining attributes and, thus, is another separability condition. Note that
choice independence implies that, for a given prole, all lotteries over a specic attribute
selected by the corresponding induced social choice functions lead to the same utility
vector (to see this, set U = ^ U in the denition of choice independence).
Finally, we impose a regularity condition.
Regularity: There exist  U 2Uand h;k 2 M such that h 6= k and, for all j 2f h;kg,
there exists a unique tangent hyperplane to the induced utility possibilities set for at-
7Recall that a0i denotes the worst alternative for agent i 2 N.
11tribute j at the point ( u1
j( `j);:::; u n
j( ` j)), where  `j 2 cj( U).
Regularity only requires the existence of some prole such that the tangent hyperplane
to two induced utility possibilities at the utility vectors induced by the choice function
is unique. Note that any bargaining solution dened on a standard domain satises a
regularity condition of that type.
We call c a generalized utilitarian social choice function if there exists t 2 n such
that, for all U 2U ,c ( U ) is a subset of the set of maximizers of
P
i2N tiui(`)o nL ( A ).
Analogously, c is a generalized Nash social choice function if there exists t 2 n such
that, for all U 2U,c ( U) is a subset of the set of maximizers of
Q
i2N ui(`)ti on L(A).
Theorem 5 Let U be the set of all proles U such that the utility possibilities set asso-
ciated with U is compact and, for each i 2 N, there exists a0i 2 A such that ui(a) 
ui(a0i)=0for all a 2 A,a n du isatises restricted a0i utility independence and restricted
additive independence. Let c be a social choice function satisfying eciency, choice inde-
pendence, and regularity. Then c is a generalized utilitarian social choice function.
Proof. Let  U 2Uand h;k 2 M be as in the denition of the regularity axiom. By
eciency and the denition of c, there exists t 2 n such that  ` is a maximizer of
P




L ( A j ) for all j 2 M. Regularity implies that, for j 2f h;kg, t is the only vector of
coecients for which ^ `j maximizes this weighted sum on L(Aj).
Let U 2Ube arbitrary. Let the prole ^ U be such that ^ ui




i 2 N and for all j 2 M nf h g .L e t^ `2c ( ^ U ). By eciency, ^ ` maximizes
P
i2N ^ ti^ ui(`)o n
L ( A )f o rs o m e^ t2 n. Theorem 3 implies that ^ `j maximizes
P
i2N ^ ti^ ui
j(`j)o nL ( A j)f o r
all j 2 M. Choice independence implies that ^ ui
h(^ `h)=^ u i
h(  ` h). By regularity, ^ t = t.
Now let the prole ~ U be such that ~ ui
k = u i
kand ^ ui
j = ui
j for all i 2 N and for all
j 2 M nf k g .L e t~ ` 2 c ( ~ U ). By eciency, ~ ` maximizes
P
i2N ~ ti~ ui(`)o nL ( A )f o rs o m e
~ t2 n . Again, Theorem 3 impliesthat ~ `j maximizes
P
i2N ~ ti~ ui
j(`j)o nL ( A j) for all j 2 M.
Choice independence implies that ~ ui
k(~ `k)=~ u i
k(  ` k). By regularity, ~ t = t.
Let ` 2 c(U). By choice independence, for all i 2 N, ui
j(`j)=u i
j( ^ ` j) for all j 2 M nfhg
and ui
h(`h)=u i
h( ~ ` h). This implies that `j maximizes
P
i2N tiui
j(`j)o nL ( A j) for all j 2 M




Analogously, the generalized Nash social choice functions are implied in the multi-
plicative case. Because the proof of this result is parallel to the proof of the previous
theorem, it is omitted.
12Theorem 6 Let U be the set of all proles U such that the utility possibilities set as-
sociated with U is compact and, for each i 2 N, there exist a0i;a i 2 A such that
ui(a)  ui(a0i)=0for all a 2 A and 1=u i( a  i)>u i( a 0 i) ,a n du isatises restricted ai
utility independence and restricted zero independence. Let c be a social choice function
satisfying eciency, choice independence, and regularity. Then c is a generalized Nash
social choice function.
An interesting feature of Theorems 5 and 6 is that the resulting social choice functions
are such that the attributes can be separated in a bargaining process: it is sucient to
consider each attribute independently of the remaining ones. This considerably facilitates
the application of the procedure to actual bargaining situations.
As an illustration, suppose the allocation of m goods in an n-agent economy is to be
determined by means of a bargaining process. If the individual preferences satisfy the
appropriate independence axioms, the results of this section can be used to justify the use
of a generalized utilitarian solution or a generalized Nash solution. By adding a symmetry
or anonymity condition, the utilitarian solution and the Nash solution are obtained.
7 Concluding remarks
The results of this paper provide a decision-theoretic foundation for specic social choice
procedures. In particular, multi-attribute decision criteria are employed. An assumption
underlying our approach is that individual preferences are of the same structure. One
possibility for extending our work would be to examine situations where individual agents
may have dierent types of utility functions over multi-attribute alternatives.
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